



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

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MEMORANDUM FOR MILITARY EDUCATION COORDINATION COUNCIL

SUBJECT: 2016 Joint Professional Military Education Special Areas of Emphasis List

1. This memo promulgates the 2016 Special Areas of Emphasis (SAE) for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) curriculum. These topics listed should be incorporated into JPME curricula at all levels.
2. SAEs are a key JPME curricula update mechanism. SAEs reflect inputs from my office, the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands and other customers of the JPME enterprise and are designed to positively enhance the relevancy of the materiel delivered to students.
3. The five SAE topics detailed in the attachment - Transregional, Multi-Function, Multi-Domain Joint Warfighting; Strategic Deterrence in the 21st Century / Deterrence and Escalation Dynamics; Counter / Anti-Corruption; Leveraging Security Force Assistance Principles to Build Partner Security Capacity; and Operation Assessment - directly serve my key focus areas of "Improving our Joint warfighting capability" and "Developing leaders for Joint Force Next."
4. Point of Contact: Jerome M. Lynes, Deputy Director for Joint Education and Doctrine, Joint Staff (J7), Jerome.m.lynes.civ@mail.mil, 703 697-7261.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Thomas D. Waldhauser", is positioned above the typed name.

THOMAS D. WALDHAUSER,
Lieutenant General, USMC
Director for Joint Force Development

Attachment:
As stated

cc:
Director, Joint Staff
Director, Joint Force Development (J7)
Deputy Director for Joint Education and Doctrine

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2016
JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (JPME)
SPECIAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS (SAE)

1. Transregional, Multi-Function, Multi-Domain Joint Warfighting

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff

The strategic landscape is characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and rapid change. While the nature of war is enduring, the character of war today is extraordinarily dynamic. Information operations, cyber capabilities, space and counter-space capabilities, and ballistic missile technology are among the true game changers on the modern battlefield. Both state and non-state actors are constantly looking for ways to harness such capabilities to avoid our strengths and exploit our vulnerabilities.

This dynamic has significant implications for how we will fight and makes it probable that future conflicts will most often be trans-regional and fought across multiple domains and functions. Driven by this assumption, one of my highest warfighting priorities is to improve our ability to integrate joint capabilities in a transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional fight.

JPME curricula should provide students with the following:

- a. An understanding of what characteristics define the current strategic landscape and the modern battlefield.
- b. A comparative perspective of the enduring nature of war vice the changing character of conflict.
- c. The ability to understand and address warfare in the seams, to include economic, information, and gray zone competition.
- d. Consideration of how current organizational and command and control constructs are (or are not) optimized for the current fight and for future challenges.
- e. A foundation for renewed thinking about how the joint force engages across the spectrum of warfare.

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2. Strategic Deterrence in the 21st Century / Deterrence and Escalation Dynamics

Submitting Agency: USSTRATCOM, USAF

Deterrence today is more complex and in some ways more difficult than during the Cold War. We must now deter multiple nuclear armed-states simultaneously through multiple domains, across multiple regions, and with multiple methods, including forward presence and the use of conventional forces. The risk that a regional adversary will try to escalate its way out of a conventional conflict is growing and explicitly recognized in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. Yet JPME generally treats nuclear deterrence as a Cold War relic and cross-domain deterrence as an interesting experiment. There is a critical need to raise the bar in content and in levels of learning across the Joint Force.

The global nature of future conflicts demands an examination of risk of strategic attacks which can impact U.S./global populations and U.S./Allied interests in unprecedented ways. Specifically, DoD faces the challenge of balancing assurance objectives, regional deterrence objectives, strategic deterrence objectives, and the long-term global implications of how/when military force is applied to protect our national security.

JPME curricula should provide students with an understanding of the following:

- a. Deterrence Theory: An evolution of the “escalation ladder” (being filled in by asymmetric caps and limited nuclear concepts), “waves” of deterrence theory (retaliation, rational actor model, perceptions/misperceptions), and extended deterrence commitment (nuclear umbrella).
- b. Escalation risk: Deterring military conflict, interwar deterrence objectives, and reestablishing deterrence after a major deterrence failure.
- c. Application: Competition between deterrence and assurance, global conflict and balancing resources to meet National-level and DoD objectives, and what can we do today-integration of campaign and contingency plans.
- d. Deterrence in the 21st century: Trans-Regional and cross-domain deterrence (both deterring threats from cross-domain capabilities and applying non-nuclear capabilities and methods, to include deterrence by denial and forward presence, to deter nuclear threats), reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, and proliferation implications.
- e. At the intermediate level, Joint Service contributions and multimodal deterrence concepts at the operational level of war.
- f. At the senior level, deterrence theories and various instruments of national power in the formation and implementation of national security strategy.
- g. At the GOFO level, the demands of 21st century strategic deterrence enabling them at the Joint enterprise level to organize and prioritize national security resources for an optimal balance of deterrence capabilities with competing demands on the U.S. Armed Forces.

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3. Counter/Anti-Corruption (CAC)

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff, J7, USCENTCOM, PKSOI

Based upon Joint and DoD assessments, corruption within partner nation institutions is a factor that increasingly challenges overall mission success in security cooperation and security force assistance. Accordingly, joint leaders must be prepared to identify corruption and integrate efforts within joint programs and operations to counter its mission-defeating effects and to maximize security development contributions to U.S. strategic success.

Three successive ISAF commanders (Petraeus, Allen, and Dunford) and OSD-P have identified corruption as a major problem affecting successful military operations. In March 2013, the Commander, US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A)/Commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF), through the Commander, US Central Command, (USCENTCOM), requested the JS J7 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division (JCOA) conduct a study examining CAC operational challenges. The resulting *Operationalizing Counter/Anti-Corruption Study, 28 February 2014*, identified gaps in senior leader abilities to understand and deal effectively with corruption in support of host nation governments. Among the several courses of actions to be considered, the study recommended that senior level professional military education PME (Senior Service Colleges/ CAPSTONE/PINNACLE) place greater emphasis on CAC lessons to prepare senior leaders to recognize and act against corruption to enable sustained mission legitimacy and enable DoD/Joint success.

Corruption is covered in part in JPME curricula as part of operational contract support (OCS); as part of "assessments" conducted within intelligence and specialized cells; and covered tangentially as part of operating environment(OE) analysis and building partner capacity (BPC). However, if JPME is to prepare leaders to meet CAC challenges identified by senior leaders in theater as well as across DoD, then a CAC SAE is required to achieve the following objectives:

JPME curricula should provide students with the ability to do the following:

- a. How to recognize and understand corruption.
 - Support Desired Leader Attribute 1: Understand the security environment.
 - Threat: Supporting leaders that abuse power undermines U.S. credibility.
- b. How to Integrate CAC considerations in Joint Planning and Assessments.
 - Identify abuses of power/position and impact on mission legitimacy/success.
 - Assess operational risk and develop options to mitigate/reduce impacts through efforts to empower/disempower leaders.
 - Integrate LL - conflict dynamics, contingency contracting, Money as Weapon System.
- c. How to translate CAC lessons from Afghanistan and other Security Cooperation (SC)/Special Force Assistance (SFA) efforts into other cultures and operating environments, present and future.
- d. How to think through the impact of corruption and CAC efforts, the military's role, and IA cooperation in the operational environment.

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4. Leveraging Security Force Assistance (SFA) Principles to Build Partner Security Capacity

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff, J7 – Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

TASK & PURPOSE: JCISFA integrates SFA doctrine, principles, and best practices into Joint- and Service-level resident professional military education (PME) programs of instruction for officers and senior enlisted in order to institutionalize understanding of SFA concepts into the future Joint Force.

RELEVANCE: With the exception of Special Operations Forces, SFA and building partner security capacity are not core competencies for any of the Services, are activities that are non-MOS specific, and do not have centers of excellence or proponents within the Services.

ENDSTATE: Providing the Joint Force with a framework on how to build partner security capacity will result in more efficient use of resources and more effective partnering. Joint Doctrine Note 1-13 "Security Force Assistance" provides a sound approach on how to build sustainable partner capacity. SFA principles provide a method to: approach building partner security capacity across all Joint Phases, shorten Phases IV and V of operations, evaluate a foreign security force, implement force development efforts to build partner security capacity, and effectively use DoD resources to achieve National end states.

JPME curricula should provide students with an understanding of the following:

- a. How SFA and building partner security capacity can be used to support unified action.
- b. How SFA principles can be used to build sustainable partner security capacity across a partnered nation's security force (Executive Direction, Generating Force, and Operational Force: EGO) by conducting the SFA developmental tasks of organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise (OTERA).
- c. How to phase a building partner security capacity plan by using the SFA stages of plan/resource, generate, employ, transition, and sustain (PGETS).
- d. How to plan and perform comprehensive pre-mission partner nation assessments (in coordination with other USG agencies) in order to determine the depth and breadth of necessary building partner security capacity/SFA efforts that will satisfy USG, and partner nation requirements.
- e. How to develop effective measures of performance and measures of effectiveness (MOPs/MOEs) and the relationship of these between USG efforts and partner nation security force efforts (i.e., USG MOEs are partner nation security force MOPs). Effective measures will enable the USG to better plan for, execute, and adjust building partner security capacity/SFA efforts to satisfy USG and partner nation requirements.

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5. Operation Assessment

Submitting Agency: USCENTCOM

Operation assessment of the current and future strategic environment provides the Joint Force Commander, Combatant Commander, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and National Command Authority the ability to better shape our national strategy, goals, and objectives as we conduct operations and campaigns. Effective operation assessment supports decision making by determining progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective or end state for the purpose of making operations and campaigns more effective. Officer professional military education should incorporate recent improvements to operation assessment doctrine to adequately prepare our leaders.

All officers need to understand the value of operation assessment, the roles and responsibilities for integrating effective operation assessments into planning and execution, and proven methods to assess progress (or regression) of a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective or end state. Observations from organizations involved in Iraq and Afghanistan have reported the lack of officer understanding of this military activity. There is value in incorporating some degree of operation assessment training across all Officer Professional Military Education (OPME).

The Joint Test and Evaluation Command's recent Joint Assessment Doctrine Evaluation (JADE) Quick Reaction Test (QRT) recommended the following:

1. Incorporate operation assessment fundamentals into core content for primary PME and JPME.
2. For intermediate level PME/JPME, build on primary level assessment training by providing detailed assessment coursework with more focus on operational-level assessments. Offer specialized elective blocks of instruction on operation assessment for planners and individuals selected to serve in assessment-related positions.
3. Add or enhance operation assessment content in existing specialized courses (JAWS, SAMS, SAASS, ORSA, Red Teaming, and CAPSTONE).

JPME curricula should provide students with an understanding of the following:

- a. An overview of the importance of Operation Assessment and the purpose of the military activity (to enhance decision making to make planning and operations more effective).
- b. The tenets of Operation Assessment (provides the best practices and ways to improve the assessment's value to the mission and commander).
- c. The roles and responsibilities for planners, operators, and leaders in assessment development, collection, monitoring, and reporting, and methods staffs organize to conduct assessments.
- d. The Operation Assessment process and how it nest within planning and execution.
- e. Methods to assess an operation (including strategic questions, IMOs, MOEs, MOPs, and other measures / indicators to inform decisions). Methods must include changes in the operational environment (using PMESII), identification of potential opportunities, identification of future risks and mitigation strategies, and recommendations to improve effectiveness.

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