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Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning



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FOREWORD

TBD

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“Our knowledge of circumstances has increased, but our uncertainty, instead of having diminished, has only increased.”

On War, Carl von Clausewitz




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1 **I. Introduction**

2 The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) adapts how the
3 Joint force applies military power in concert with non-military efforts to
4 promote and defend U.S. national interests. Its purpose is to guide force
5 development and inform how leaders and planners visualize, understand,
6 decide, and direct lethal and non-lethal activities at the strategic and
7 operational levels of war. Driving the publication of this concept is a new-
8 found appreciation of the changes in the future operating environment and an
9 examination of lessons from recent campaigns.

10
11 More than simply recognizing change, this concept aims to instill a deep
12 appreciation that many aspects of the future security environment are likely to
13 be significantly different than what we have experienced over the past several
14 decades. Adversaries have carefully studied the Western way of war and are
15 adapting in ways that exploit our every seam and vulnerability. They are
16 avoiding U.S. strengths and finding ways to achieve their political objectives in
17 ways not easily countered by the Joint Force and other instruments of national
18 power. Furthermore, they are taking steps to seize the initiative, which means
19 the Joint Force will likely not begin every conflict on the offense. With this in
20 mind, the JCIC aims to begin the process of eliminating gaps and mitigating
21 vulnerabilities in the way the Joint Force designs, plans, and executes
22 campaigns. It seeks to alter the way in which Geographic Combatant
23 Commands campaign so that military operations do more than simply achieve
24 military objectives. Synchronized with inter-organizational and multinational
25 partners, military campaign plans will ensure they contribute to a range of
26 favorable, enduring political outcomes.

27 This document aims to be evolutionary in many regards and revolutionary
28 in others. It builds on the lessons of the past and offers what some may regard
29 as a paradigm shift in the way the Joint Force employs military power. The
30 concept recognizes the enduring nature of war and the fact that war remains a
31 clash of irreconcilable wills, each aiming to dominate through the use of
32 violence. The endeavor is inherently human, political, and uncertain. The
33 concept highlights that in some circumstances subtle, non-lethal employment
34 of military power, when combined with limited lethal force that is not easily
35 attributable, can achieve substantial political aims. Finally, it aims to elevate
36 the importance of consolidating gains once military objectives are met. Military
37 gains alone are meaningless if they do not, in concert with the other
38 instruments of national power, achieve the strategic objectives of the campaign.

39
40 **II. Scope**

41 This concept focuses on future Joint Force campaigning which will occur
42 within the context of an increasingly complex international order. It offers a
43 solution to state and non-state actors seeking to alter the international order

44 using novel combinations of lethal and non-lethal power. It does not intend to
45 account for each and every security challenge but instead principally addresses
46 the application of military and non-military instruments of national power to
47 achieve sustainable political outcomes.
48

49 **III. Future Operating Environment**

50 As described in the *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2016: Risk and*
51 *Choice in a Contested and Disordered World*, the future OE will present the
52 Joint Force with both high and low end threats.¹ While leaders today will find
53 some challenges to be familiar, other challenges will differ significantly from
54 those of recent decades. The two overarching challenges are categorized as
55 *spreading disorder* and *contested norms*. Both will have significant implications
56 to how the Joint Force campaigns.

57 **Spreading Disorder**

58 The challenge most familiar to leaders of today is the one of *spreading*
59 *disorder*. It is characterized by an array of weak states that remain or become
60 increasingly incapable of maintaining domestic order or good governance.²
61 While the Joint Force will not be called upon to assist each failing state or
62 resolve every civil war, the likelihood that it will operate in these conditions is
63 high.³ The fact that nearly nine out of every ten wars is a civil war indicates
64 that the Joint Force is highly likely to be involved in stabilization missions
65 ranging from intervention in an internal conflict, to relief of human suffering, to
66 combating terrorist networks.⁴

67 **Implications of the Spreading Disorder Challenge**

68 The implications to the Joint Force of spreading disorder are significant.
69 The following implications pertain to the way the Joint Force designs, plans
70 and executes campaigns:
71

72 • **Preventing war will remain critical to U.S. national security.** Because
73 disorder emanating from weak states results from internal struggles for
74 primacy, impacts to U.S. interests and values are likely to be unintentional.
75 Consequently, threats of punitive action will be largely ineffective in preventing
76 this type of conflict. Instead, the Joint Force must be prepared to employ more
77 positive approaches to limit and contain the spread of disorder, such as
78 activities to influence neutrals while providing assistance and reassurance to
79 partners.
80

81 The spread of disorder raises the likelihood that the Joint Force will once
82 again be involved in stability operations. Although policy makers and public
83 opinion have generally been averse to such operations in the years following
84 OIF and OEF, lessons of history indicate that state-internal disorder will
85 impact U.S. interests. Looking to the future, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,

86 said in 2007 that unconventional wars were “the ones most likely to be fought
87 in the years ahead.”⁵ While this concept makes no policy prescriptions, it
88 recognizes the high likelihood that the future Joint Force will be called upon to
89 stabilize troubled regions.

90

91 • **Stabilizing environments will become increasingly important.**

92

93 The spread of regional disorder highlights the need for lasting political
94 outcomes. The achievement of such lasting outcomes will require a recognition
95 of the dual nature of war. On the one hand, there is a coercive, negative
96 component necessary to defeat an adversary, and on the other hand, a positive,
97 constructive component to bring about a stable and desirable political
98 settlement.⁶ While the second component is often overlooked or misunderstood,
99 the establishment of political order is part of war itself.⁷ The two components
100 cannot be disaggregated.

101

102 While the Joint Force must be prepared to excel in armed conflict,
103 success on the battlefield by itself is inadequate. Victory of one’s adversary is
104 *the price of admission* for a seat at the negotiating table for the post-war order.⁸
105 Or, stated more simply, force is subservient to politics.⁹

106

107 For joint leaders and planners designing, planning and executing
108 campaigns, there should be an emphasis on consolidating activities from early
109 in the planning process to ensure consistency with the national security
110 interests at stake. The need to consolidate gains has profound implications for
111 planning, command relationships, and organization. They should view combat
112 operations and governance operations as both integral to war and occurring in
113 tandem.

114

115 Because political issues permeate every aspect of war, the creation of a
116 favorable political order has been central to all wars fought by the United
117 States which resulted in a strategic victory.¹⁰ Failure to do so results in
118 strategic failure. This was evidenced during OIF, where inadequate planning for
119 the restoration of political and economic order following major combat
120 operations led to an inability to consolidate gains, which in turn has resulted
121 in a protracted and ongoing disorder.

122

123 **Contested Norms**

124 The other challenge described in the JOE 2016 is that of *contested*
125 *norms*. This is the idea that increasingly powerful revisionist states and non-
126 state actors will use any and all elements of national power to establish their
127 own set of rules in ways unfavorable to the United States and its interests.
128 Already the world has witnessed adaptive state and non-state adversaries using
129 creative strategies to apply purposeful combinations of conventional and non-

130 conventional force. These strategies attempt to achieve objectives while
131 avoiding direct armed conflict with the U.S. by exploiting the seams and gaps
132 in U.S. military operational constructs, institutional processes, and thinking.

133 Adversaries will operate in ways that frustrate joint leaders and planner's
134 traditional campaign planning tools by accomplishing objectives in the
135 competitive space between war and peace. Rivals employing coercive force to
136 achieve their objectives *below our political / military response* thresholds will
137 prove particularly problematic. They will aim to change international norms
138 with operations characterized by the uncertainty, murkiness of the parties
139 involved, or ambiguity about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.¹¹ This
140 approach of coercive gradualism is now referred to by some as "gray zone"
141 challenges.

142
143 Efforts to change international norms may resemble traditional,
144 "conventional" conflicts between states. More likely, however, adversaries will
145 combine some type of coercion with the use of force. They will maintain and
146 air of ambiguity about the ultimate objectives, the players, and continued
147 legitimacy of international treaties and norms. Adversaries may combine
148 sabotage, social media campaigns, cyber-attacks, and proxy forces instead of
149 easily recognizable armed forces of a state violating international borders.

150
151 A recent example of such an approach is China's rapid construction of
152 artificial islands in the disputed Spratly island chain. Building an island is
153 clearly not an act of war, but one that over the long-term can significantly
154 increase China's territorial control and regional influence. China's efforts to
155 build military bases in the middle of an international waterway is indicative of
156 creeping tactics and is difficult to define as openly hostile to international
157 norms.¹²

158
159 Another example is Iran's proxy wars. Since the 1980s Iran supplied the
160 militant organization Hezbollah in Lebanon with substantial amounts of
161 military training, weapons, political, and financial aid. Acting on behalf of Iran,
162 Hezbollah fought against Israel in the 2006 Lebanon War. Iran currently has
163 involved itself in the conflict in Syria, where it is training and equipping
164 government forces. Iran's involvement in the Syrian conflict is a proxy conflict
165 against other regional powers.

166
167 Finally, Russia's aggression against the Ukraine and the Crimea using
168 non-linear tactics highlights the distinction Russia makes between the political
169 realm and the security realm. Russia now appears to be waging competition
170 through a shrewd combination of diplomatic, informational, military, and
171 economic means. Moscow likely recognizes its weakness relative to the U.S.
172 and is therefore subtly competing rather than using more confrontational

173 approaches.¹³ Many implications of Russia and others contesting norms critical
174 to the international order are emerging.

175
176 **Implications of the *Contested Norms* Challenge**

177 The implications of challenges to contested norms emerging in the future
178 operating environment are substantial. The following implications pertain to
179 how the Joint Force currently designs, plans and executes campaigns:

- 180
181 • **The binary, peace / war model that Joint Force doctrine and**
182 **processes employ is becoming inconsistent with emerging patterns of**
183 **warfare.** When considering the range of military operations, current Joint
184 doctrine describes those operations in the context of some degree of conflict.
185 Conflict, in whatever degree, is the only condition requiring the military




Figure 1: Notional Operation Plan Phases (JP 3-0, 11 Aug 2011)

186 instrument of national power. Similarly, DoD processes are primarily designed
187 to resource commands when in conflict and then withdraw those resources
188 when conflict terminates. However, the trends of the emerging operating
189 environment indicate that adversaries will achieve war-time like objectives in
190 what is not initially perceived to be conflict. Rather, they will operate beneath
191 the threshold that constitutes a state of conflict so as not to trigger a
192 meaningful response by the U.S., its allies, or partners. The current conflict
193 continuum, as depicted in Joint Publication 3-0 and in Figure 1, does not
194 adequately account for the wide range of conditions, or what was earlier
195 described as the gray zone. Within the conditions between peace and war
196 adversaries are increasingly employing strategies and tactics to achieve their
197 objectives previously secured primarily by way of open armed conflict. The
198 military instrument of national power will have utility *well outside conditions*
199

200 considered to be conflict to counter adversaries that seek to subtly undermine
 201 U.S. national security interests. Left unchecked, adversary strategies will seize
 202 upon the inability of U.S. planners and institutional processes to react to or be
 203 aware of threats that occur gradually.
 204

205 • **Combatant Commands will lack the agility to deny active**
 206 **competitors their objectives.** Because so many of the activities required to
 207 actively counter an adversary operating below the threshold triggering a U.S.
 208 response are only executed within early phases of a contingency plan, GCCs do
 209 not have at the ready the authorities, permissions, and resources needed to
 210 campaign effectively. Until unambiguous conflict warning triggers a
 211 contingency response, GCCs will be out of position and not fully empowered to
 212 regain the initiative. They will not be optimized to prevent, deter, or counter an
 213 adversary’s efforts to undermine U.S. national security objectives early and
 214 thereby deter broader conflict. Mindful of this vulnerability, adversaries will
 215 operate below the threshold likely to trigger a contingency plan into operation.




Figure 2: JP 5-0 Notional Operation Plan Phases

216 Currently, GCCs are directed to develop a theater strategy which articulates
 217 the commander’s vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities
 218 and operations with the other instruments of national power to achieve
 219 national strategic objectives. The Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) flows from the
 220 Theater Strategy and provides an action plan to implement the strategy.
 221 Theater Campaigns employ “normal and routine” shaping activities designed to

222 influence the security environment, not actively counter a dynamically adaptive
223 enemy.

224 In contrast, contingency plans are the specific branch plans to a TCP
225 designed to deal with potential crises in the region, rectify failures of the
226 steady-state activities, or defeat enemies. Although not originally intended to be
227 a universally prescriptive template for all joint operations, the Notional
228 Operation Plan Phases in Figure 2 have become the accepted model for phased
229 delegation of authorities, permissions, and resources. This model is ill-suited
230 for the patterns of emerging warfare.

231 • **Adversaries will be more agile than the U.S. in synchronizing and**
232 **applying their elements of national power.** Future adversaries will be adept
233 at exploiting the lack of coordination between USG departments and agencies.
234 Disjointed efforts and the lack of unity of command between the Department of
235 Defense and other USG Departments comprising the national security
236 apparatus will create opportunities for adversaries to shape the security
237 environment in ways detrimental to U.S. and partner interests. Autocratic and
238 semi-autocratic regimes will possess a marked advantage for making strategic
239 decisions quickly and ensuring unity of effort. Whereas the U.S. political
240 system relies heavily on consensus and domestic support to national security
241 approaches, regimes seeking to undermine US national security enjoy an
242 atmosphere of compliance allowing decisions across agencies to be carried out
243 quickly. While there are notable drawbacks inherent to autocratic
244 governments, they will hold a pronounced advantage with regard to strategic
245 agility and national power synchronization.

246 • **A complex and rapidly changing operational environment will**
247 **challenge GCCs to understand and develop solutions.** The degree of change
248 in enemy tactics, coupled with the shifting relative U.S. advantage in the
249 military and diplomatic spheres will present difficult, complicated problem sets
250 for leaders and planners. While the mental models resident in Joint and
251 Service doctrine¹⁴ will remain of great value to leaders and planners alike, the
252 profoundly unfamiliar future will complicate planning and solution
253 development. The practice of modifying operational approaches that proved
254 successful in the past will fall short of achieving national security objectives.

255

256 **IV. The Military Challenge.**

257 *How will the Joint Force design, plan, and execute joint campaigns in conjunction*
258 *with interorganizational and multinational partners to overcome the emerging*
259 *complexities of the future operating environment?*

260

261

262

263

264 **V. A Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning.**

265 **Central Idea.** To meet the military challenge, the future Joint Force will
266 employ an *Integrated Campaigning Approach* that:

- 267 1) Views the environment as one comprised of cooperation, competition,
268 and armed conflict;
269 2) Employs an alternative joint campaigning construct;
270 3) Aligns efforts with the other instruments of power; and
271 4) Applies an expanded set of principles for planning and execution.
272

273 The *Integrated Campaigning Approach* combines military and non-military
274 activities with greater agility to gain and maintain the initiative in a complex
275 environment against adversaries aiming to subtly undermine U.S., allied, and
276 partner national security interests.

277 **Central Idea Component 1: A Different View of the Environment**

278 Since emerging patterns of warfare are becoming inconsistent with a
279 binary, peace / war model, the *Integrated Campaigning Approach* employs a
280 different conception of the international security environment. The approach
281 no longer considers the U.S. as simply at either peace or at war with a
282 particular actor but instead outlines three categories. The *Integrated*
283 *Campaigning Approach* visualizes geostrategic relationships as being in either a
284 condition of *cooperation*, *competition*, or *conflict*. While the thresholds between
285 these conditions may not always be clear, the conditions are mutually exclusive
286 of one another. For instance, the relationship between the U.S. and an
287 adversary may be characterized as being in geostrategic competition, even
288 though at some lower levels there is clear evidence of cooperation. Visualizing
289 the geostrategic relationship between the U.S. and its adversaries enables
290 leaders and planners to understand the challenges, some of which will be
291 overcome using military power.

292 In the *zone of cooperation*, the U.S. is working with a state or non-state
293 actor to achieve mutual interests and arrangements. This is characterized, for
294 example, by trade agreements, mutual defense pacts, and treaties to promote,
295 strengthen, and support. In this zone, elements of national power are primarily
296 employed to influence using diplomatic, informational, and economic means. In
297 this condition, the Joint Force may be employed to assure an ally or partner,
298 enhance interoperability to meet mutually agreed upon security objectives, or
299 even to prepare for conflict. Operations may include those to build partner
300 capacity, provide humanitarian assistance or disaster relief, or counter the
301 narcotic trade. Although the military does not employ coercive or punitive
302 measures in this zone, a strong and ready Joint Force mitigates the risks
303 associated with the transient nature of some relationships in the international
304 system.

305



Figure 3: Seeing the Environment Differently

306 Despite the benefits made possible through cooperation, some actors
 307 choose not to engage in mutually beneficial relations. Instead, they view
 308 international relations as a zero-sum game, where the gains of one actor are
 309 commensurately balanced by the losses of another. These actors are viewed as
 310 strategic competitors and operate in what this concept refers to as a *zone of*
 311 *competition*. This is a condition in which the U.S. government is not currently
 312 organized to effectively employ the military instrument of power. Within this
 313 *zone of competition*, the Joint Force will counter actors employing the
 314 previously mentioned tactic of coercive gradualism as well as those openly
 315 challenging U.S. interests. In this zone there may be an appearance of
 316 cooperation along with elements of conflict. Relations do not escalate to armed
 317 conflict because one or both actors lack the means or the will to do so. In the
 318 *zone of competition*, the military instrument of power deters those adversaries
 319 contemplating armed conflict, contains ambitious adversaries and
 320 demonstrates resolve to geopolitical rivals. These political ends are achieved
 321 through operations such as security force assistance, foreign internal defense,
 322 show of force, or support to insurgencies.

323 Finally, there is a *zone of armed conflict* where core interests are so
 324 irreconcilable that violence is the primary means used to achieve political
 325 objectives. Conflict, up to and including intense armed conflict, occurs until

326 one or both actors capitulate. This is the one condition in which the Joint
327 Force is currently organized to operate. In armed conflict the Joint Force fights
328 and wins major operations, whether defeating an insurgency, conventional
329 force, or combination of the two.

330 Visualizing the environment in terms of cooperation, competition, and
331 armed conflict is vital to understanding the challenges and organizing activities
332 of the future.

333

334 **Central Idea Component 2: An Integrated Campaign Construct**

335 The second and arguably the core aspect of this concept is the *Integrated*
336 *Campaigning Construct*. It is an alternative to the existing campaign construct
337 that will guide how the Joint Force designs, plans, and executes campaigns.
338 The *Integrated Campaigning Construct* is a deliberate departure from existing
339 doctrine and campaign construct found in CJCSM 3130.01, *Campaign*
340 *Planning Procedures and Responsibilities*. This new framework will enable
341 commanders to develop a menu of authorized and resourced options at his or
342 her disposal. In the future, campaigns will simultaneously employ multiple
343 elements of engagement, deterrence, denial, disruption or even degradation.

344 Because competition and conflict will likely not unfold in the predictable
345 manner envisaged in the existing model for Operation Plan Phases, Theater
346 Campaigns will no longer be comprised of only “normal and routine” shaping
347 activities, commonly referred to as Phase 0 operations. Conversely, a dynamic
348 combination of activities previously only authorized, permitted, and resourced
349 with the activation of a contingency operation will be options for the
350 commander. To compete with adversaries short of armed conflict, many of the
351 activities previously executed only in specific phases of contingency plans will
352 now be conducted as part of the Theater Campaign. Military activities will be
353 arranged to seize the initiative and when necessary, regain the initiative to alter
354 a trend that runs counter to U.S. national security objectives.

355 Of note, major combat operations required to dominate an opponent in
356 open armed conflict will remain distinct from Theater Campaigns. Contingency
357 operations will remain branches of a Theater Campaign and require a separate
358 execution order, activated only upon the issuance of a National Command
359 Authority directive.

360 Contrary to what is depicted in the Notional Operation Plan Phases, the
361 level of military effort required to defend and secure national objectives will not
362 necessarily be greatest during a “dominate” phase of an operation. The level of
363 effort required to deter an opponent or stabilize the regional security
364 environment may, overtime, be more substantial than that required to defeat a
365 military force in open armed conflict. This represents a significant change from
366 the previous peace/war construct that tied resources, authorities and
367 permissions to phases of contingency operations.

368 Intended to significantly increase the agility with which Combatant
 369 Commands counter adversaries with whom we compete, the *Integrated*
 370 *Campaigning Construct* enables commanders to dynamically employ military
 371 capabilities, aligned with the other USG efforts, based on mission orders.
 372 Beginning with a clear understanding of the desired conditions the Joint Force
 373 is tasked to achieve, commanders are empowered to counter state and non-
 374 state actors who seek to increase their strategic position and influence at the
 375 expense of U.S., ally and partner interests. Countering state and non-state
 376 actors will be accomplished through several means such as deterrence or
 377 regional engagement.




Figure 4: Alternate Joint Campaigning Construct

378 The *Integrated Campaigning Construct*, depicted in Figure 4, first calls for
 379 leaders and planners to understand and then describe the present relationship
 380 between the U.S. and a particular state or non-state actor in terms of
 381 *cooperation, competition, or armed conflict*. The second step is to then forecast
 382 what the future situation is likely to be if measures are not taken to alter that
 383 trajectory. Lastly, planners arrange military shaping or deterring activities
 384 that, once executed, alter the trajectory of the relations between the U.S. and
 385 the adversary.

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386 Commanders will require authorities, permissions, and resources
387 delegated to them well in advance in order to proactively lead in this future
388 security environment. The nature and scope of these activities as well as their
389 intentions will be the subjects of rigorous discourse between the National
390 Command Authority, the interagency, regional allies and partners, the Country
391 Team(s), and the Combatant Command.

392 When *cooperating* with an actor, theater campaigns are crafted to
393 strengthen relations and promote regional security. Activities may include
394 maintaining forward presence, aligning forces regionally, working to enhance
395 interoperability, providing advice, conducting theater security cooperation, or
396 providing security force assistance. Reserve units may be employed to sustain
397 long-term relationships by applying their unique civil-military expertise across
398 military, government, economic, and social spheres. Cooperative relations
399 produce more informed campaigns through early warning, indigenous
400 solutions, and enhanced situational awareness.

401 Campaign activities intended to *compete* with the Nation's adversaries or
402 geopolitical rivals will be distinctly different than those of the past. They may
403 include complex information operations designed to counter propaganda
404 campaigns, or, for instance, security force assistance missions to restore the
405 stability of a partner nation. Campaigns in this future environment will aim to
406 achieve conditions that are closest to our desired strategic aims knowing full
407 well that competition will remain on-going and that there will be no permanent
408 absence of conflict.

409 The articulation of a military end state in this situation would run counter
410 to the *Integrated Campaigning Approach* due to the fact that many military
411 operations such as those designed to deter an adversary, reassure or support
412 an partner, will not have discrete end points. Missions to achieve these
413 objectives, as well as other missions involving U.S. forward presence to deter
414 an opponent, will remain on-going as long as they support U.S. national
415 security interests. Desired political outcomes will be expressed in terms of a
416 future state of competition or one of cooperation. Therefore, the approach will
417 not call upon planners to pre-determine a military end state as contingency
418 operations have in the past but describe the desired condition(s) of the U.S.
419 and the adversary relative to a state of *cooperation*, *competition*, or *armed*
420 *conflict*. While that desired condition will never be permanently secured,
421 consolidating the gains made as a result of the campaign will be critical.

422 Ambiguity in the future operating environment will challenge the ability to
423 understand the strength of one's position. The need to consolidate gains, or,
424 strengthen the Joint Force's or the alliance's position following a successful
425 campaign activities may not be entirely obvious. *The Integrated Campaigning*
426 *Approach* cautions leaders and planners to guard against the temptation of
427 terminating military effort once having seized the initiative. In all likelihood,
428 partner institutions in areas such as governance and rule of law will require

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429 sustained support. Strengthening the state and its institutions will likely
430 remain key to enabling lasting success and perpetuating conditions well into
431 the future.

432
433 Finally, this concept alters the manner in which the joint force will
434 campaign in *armed conflict* in two significant ways. First, when deterrence fails,
435 the joint force will conduct joint combined arms operations in order to present
436 the enemy with multiple dilemmas. The other deals again with the
437 consolidation of gains. Strengthening critical institutions will follow tactical
438 and operational success so that military victory yields enduring strategic
439 outcomes. Contingency planning and operations will occur as in the past, but
440 the Joint Force will confound its enemies with the synergistic effects of joint
441 operations and plan to ensure hard earned results are transitioned into lasting,
442 favorable strategic success.

443 This concept acknowledges that the various regions of the world are not
444 the same and therefore Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) problem sets
445 are vastly different. For those GCCs contending with an intense security
446 competition in its area of responsibility will have delegated authorities and
447 permissions unlike those GCCs that are not experiencing significant threats to
448 the international order. In other words, the *Integrated Campaigning Approach*
449 will have differing applicability to each Combatant Command. Further, how
450 each GCC synchronizes its activities with the other instruments of national
451 power will also vary.

452 **Central Idea Component 3: Greater intra-governmental synchronization.**

453 This concept does not aim to solve the multifaceted challenge of
454 interagency coordination. While the USG has made impressive progress,
455 especially since the 9/11 attacks, this concept appreciates that POTUS is the
456 lowest level at which interagency coordination can be directed. This challenge
457 nevertheless does not preclude the Department of Defense from articulating
458 how Geographic and Functional Combatant Command activities may relate to
459 and support the efforts of other U.S. department and agencies.

460 To overcome the challenges inherent in cooperation, competition, and
461 conflict, commanders will work to align military activities in time, space, and
462 purpose so that they are synchronized with the activities of other governmental
463 departments and agencies. For example military activities may require
464 coordination with the ambassador and the Country Team. Theater and
465 Functional Campaigns will consider how military activities can support
466 diplomatic, informational and/or economic efforts to counter an adversary or,
467 where required, articulate how these instruments of power can support military
468 efforts. Achieving this integration will require a planning process which
469 includes participants outside the DoD. Because the Joint Force is the most
470 well-resourced entity in the national security apparatus, it may often fall upon
471 the military to lead coordination efforts even though it will clearly not dictate

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472 how other departments and agencies achieve objectives in their respective
473 areas of responsibility.

474 **Central Idea Component 4: Expanded Principles for Planning and**
475 **Execution.** *Integrated campaigning* is guided by a foundational set of principles
476 that complement and expand upon existing campaign planning design and
477 doctrine.

478 a. *Promote a culture of mutual support.* In the future, global problems
479 will not be solved by the U.S., and joint force, alone. An organizational culture
480 able to identify, integrate as appropriate, and routinely leverage the
481 comparative advantages of U.S. and foreign networks in defense, development,
482 and diplomacy will be required. Multiple venues, contingent on specific
483 environmental circumstance, will dictate how this principle is pursued; but the
484 outcome is the integrated, aligned & mutually supporting elements of national
485 power and U.S. partner's objectives and activities.

486
487 The difference from
488 previous doctrinal
489 discussions of inter-
490 organizational coordination,
491 unified action, and unity of
492 effort, is in viewing mutually
493 supporting, cooperative
494 activities as a persistent and
495 flexible element of
496 campaigning, vice simply a
497 specific operational
498 requirement. A culture of
499 broad mutual support and alignment of objectives and activities doesn't
500 invalidate previous doctrine, it simply broadens its application for JFCs. JFCs
501 view alignment of objectives and activities across the spectrum of 'design,
502 coordination, plan, and execute' of joint campaigning, while consistently
503 assessing/re-assessing the requirements and effectiveness, across the
504 environment of cooperation and competition.

Principles of Integrated Campaigning
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Promote a culture of mutual support and alignment of national and partner objectives and activities.• Utilize embedded and disciplined assessments• Assume political aims will evolve• Employ hybrid command relationships• Consider all facets of risk• Remain focused on strategic objectives• Broad, relevant, and precise elements of joint campaign design.

505 We live in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world. U.S.
506 vital interests, and challenges to those interests, must leverage all elements of
507 national power, allies, partners, and even some rivals to adapt and respond.
508 Integration and harmonization of stakeholder objectives and activities into a
509 mutually supportive and aligned campaign is an essential principle of
510 integrated campaigning.

511 In the future, implementing this strategy will require a broader and deeper
512 culture of integration and alignment of activity to maintain and advance global
513 mutual interests. A culture of mutual support recognizes the limitations of US
514 capacity and capabilities, and that joint force campaign(s) are a primary

515 component to U.S. global leadership in an increasingly complex and uncertain
516 world.

517 Generally, and in priority order, the following are the targets of a
518 sustained culture of mutual support, and alignment of objectives and activities
519 within the Joint Force; within DoD (i.e. SOF-CF, Maneuver-Support, Service-
520 Service); amongst the USG (i.e. DoD-Departments/agencies); amongst allies
521 and partners (i.e. DoD-Foreign Forces & Ministries); amongst non-state and
522 non-governmental entities (i.e. DoD-Regional/Global Security & Governance
523 entities; civic organizations; popular movements). The specific 'who?' will be
524 driven practically by the operational and strategic conditions and challenges as
525 they emerge and evolve. The more general 'who?' is foundationally built on our
526 traditional, and more capable, networks of allies and partners – regionally and
527 globally.

528 This culture of mutual support and alignment of objectives and activities
529 must be a continuous and constant element and consideration within joint
530 planning. It must be a central consideration that seeks to leverage partners'
531 capabilities, and then integrate those capabilities as part of campaign plans.
532 We must continuously reevaluate those campaigns to flexibly adapt to
533 changing conditions that may point to different partners in different situations,
534 addressing evolving or different challenges, and sustaining conditions for
535 stability and continued development.

536 This culture of mutual support and alignment of objectives and activities
537 must generally be applied continuously and globally. The joint force must
538 contextually prioritize the 'why?', 'where?', and 'when?' to coordinate and
539 synchronize capabilities and capacities that leverage the greatest value for US
540 national interests regionally and trans-regionally.

541 Ultimately this new culture of mutual support and alignment of objectives
542 and activities will be part of more flexible and expanded options to U.S. policy
543 makers. It will enable the Joint Force to advance, sustain, and protect US
544 national interests and objectives globally through sharing of capacity,
545 capabilities, and risk. It will better enable the JFCs to adapt to constant and
546 continuous changes in conditions in the global operating environment, and
547 evolve and adapt U.S. campaigns to maintain global stability and continued
548 development and prosperity.

549 b. *Utilize embedded and disciplined assessments.* Information
550 requirements across all echelons have increased exponentially as the world has
551 grown more complex and volatile. The current demand for information exceeds
552 the analytical abilities of the joint force and is straining collection assets.
553 Furthermore, Combatant Commands are challenged to collect, process,
554 analyze, and incorporate information in a timely manner. In order to focus
555 efforts and provide more accurate assessments, a robust analysis program
556 must be embedded into the campaign planning process.

557 A robust analysis program is comprised of an assessment plan supported
558 by an accompanying information collection plan. These plans are embedded
559 into every step of the campaigning process. Integrating information collection
560 and assessment plans into the campaigning process serves three purposes: (1)
561 it will confirm baseline conditions, (2) it will facilitate real-time monitoring
562 mechanisms, and (3) it will enable accurate assessments of campaign progress.
563 Evaluating baseline conditions is paramount to developing an effective
564 campaign plan. In competitive environments plans are developed without an
565 thorough understanding of preexisting conditions. Once a baseline is
566 established, an effective campaign can be developed. As the campaign
567 progresses, a deliberate data collection and assessment plan allows staffs to
568 accurately monitor the campaign. Focused collection and assessment efforts
569 provide staffs with essential information, reducing the flood of superfluous
570 information received under current practices. Access to the 'right' information
571 at the 'right' time grants commanders the operational flexibility to react to
572 emerging trends. Finally, a detailed assessment and collection plan facilitates
573 an accurate measurement of the campaigns' performance. Performance
574 evaluations and assessments will become increasingly important as financial
575 resources continue to diminish.

576 Finally, assessment as part of integrated campaigning requires
577 discipline, both of the process and in the minds of those involved. Focus, both
578 in the application of collection activities and in the resulting evaluation of data,
579 leads to more certainty in assessment results. This focus only comes through
580 careful and deliberate consideration of the operating environment, objectives,
581 and available resources as the plan is developed and while it is executed.
582 Disciplined and thorough thought about what to measure, how that data
583 relates to the objectives, how to measure it, and how to analyze it must be done
584 in advance, and continuously updated, in order to reap the full benefits of
585 assessment as an element of the campaign.

586 c. *Assume political aims will evolve.* Although doctrine calls for the
587 receipt of clear and timely guidance, the nature of the strategic environment is
588 ambiguous, uncertain and often volatile. Strategic ends may not translate
589 easily to the given environment, or they may evolve as political aims change. In
590 spite of this, planners must understand the environment, anticipate
591 developments, and build flexible plans that give direction to joint forces
592 operating in the theater. Revisions to planned activities based on assessments
593 and feedback will often be conducted in a fluid environment. As such, planners
594 must closely observe ongoing developments and revise plans, when necessary,
595 at a speed that matches the dynamic changes within the environment.

596 d. *Employ hybrid command relationships.* The *Integrated Campaigning*
597 *Approach* requires adaptive and innovative methods of exercising joint force
598 command relationships during operations. Hybrid command relationships are
599 defined as new approaches, consistent with current statutory direction, to the

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600 traditional joint force command relationships defined in joint doctrine. While
601 enduring joint command relationships such as combatant command (command
602 authority) (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON),
603 and support will continue to be used to exercise command over assigned and
604 allocated joint forces, future supported JFCs may need to exercise, pre-define,
605 or re-define command relationships by operational phase, operational task(s),
606 mission, or threat-based considerations both within or across established
607 theater or operational boundaries in order to gain strategic agility, retain the
608 initiative, address trans-regional challenges, or more effectively apply scarce
609 resources. New command relationship approaches will be exercised or
610 delegated by supported combatant commanders through pre-coordinated
611 arrangements with their supporting combatant commands with assigned and
612 attached forces when possible. These arrangements will be codified and
613 endorsed through subsequent CJCS execution orders during campaign
614 execution. Supported combatant commanders will continue to exercise and
615 direct command relationships, to include hybrid command relationships,
616 through direction to their assigned subordinate commands and forces as
617 required. Reallocation of allocated subordinate forces to meet another
618 supported combatant command's emergent requirements will be managed and
619 executed through Global Force Management (GFM) allocation processes and
620 procedures.

621 e. *Consider all facets of risk.* Joint doctrine currently defines risk as
622 "probability and severity of loss linked to hazards." (JP 1-02, p 248) However,
623 this sterile definition lacks context and therefore applying it as part of a
624 campaign often proves to be challenging. More nuance is required for planners
625 to be able to consider and mitigate all aspects of risk, particularly as part of
626 campaign planning.

627 Strategic risk can be described as the balance between probability and
628 consequence of threats to the Nation. At a high level, military risk could be
629 considered bounded by the Joint Force's ability to generate ready forces,
630 execute current operations, and respond to potential contingencies over time.
631 More specifically, military risk is affected by the ability of US Armed Forces to
632 adequately resource, execute, and sustain military operations in support of
633 strategic objectives of the NMS. Historically, military planning has focused
634 military risk considerations on three aspects: 1) Risk to Mission, 2) Risk to
635 Force, and 3) Risk to Readiness. Risk to Mission considers our ability to
636 execute assigned missions and the strategic costs, given available resources
637 and the threat. Risk to Force centers on the human, material, and financial
638 costs of our actions and whether they are acceptable. Risk to Readiness
639 includes the Military Departments' or Services' risk associated with the ability
640 to recruit, man, train, equip, and sustain the force to meet strategic objectives
641 described in the NMS. While all of these aspects of risk are certainly valid, they
642 are incomplete when applied against the broad spectrum of potential military
643 action, our strategic objectives, and the play of international relations.

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644 In campaigning, consideration of risk must be all encompassing. In
645 addition to simple considerations of risk to mission, force and readiness,
646 prudent planning must also consider other aspects of risk that better connect
647 strategic objectives to tactical actions. For instance, in a pre-conflict scenario,
648 there is risk associated with non-action, or opportunity risk, with absence of
649 U.S. military involvement potentially leading to an escalation of tensions,
650 destabilization of the region or state, or kinetic action. Alternatively, there is
651 also risk associated with engagement, or consequence risk, since every action
652 creates a counter-action thereby leading to a changed environment following
653 U.S. operations. In addition, there is risk associated with the scale of
654 commitment, or proportionality risk, with too much or too little commitment
655 both risking strategic or operational failure.

656 With campaign plans and their execution simply being a means to put
657 decisions in motion, ensuring that those decisions take into consideration all
658 aspects of risk as part of the planning process and during execution is vital to
659 campaign success. Holistic risk examination, followed by tangible mitigation
660 planning, ensures that decision makers are fully equipped to provide guidance
661 for campaign development that leads to achievement of both short and long
662 term objectives.

663 f. *Remain focused on the Strategic Objectives.* DOD and Joint doctrine
664 have incorporated the concept of the operational level of war for almost forty
665 years. The connecting level of war between strategy and tactics, it provides a
666 mechanism for senior military leaders to translate political goals into concrete
667 tasks for military forces. Over time, however, the understanding and practice
668 of this concept have become muddied, leading to what amounts to transposing
669 high tactical actions to the operational level, and a seemingly resulting gap
670 between military actions and achieving desired strategic objectives. The
671 alignment of political and military objectives is not a bonus, it is required to
672 translate advances made through the use of military power to strategic
673 (political) success. This is accomplished by integrating activities and aligning
674 the objectives of all elements of national power, and leveraging the alignment of
675 allied, partner and even rival stateholder activities to pursue US interests. In
676 this sense all instruments of national power, and some instruments of partner,
677 ally and rival power, are interdependent – requiring alignment and mutual
678 support to achieve strategic success.

679 g. *Broad, relevant, and precise elements of joint campaign design.*
680 Currently, joint operation planning and execution has thirteen elements of
681 operational design.¹⁵ The current elements are overly simplistic and focused
682 on assisting Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) and their staffs craft operations to
683 defeat an adversaries' war-making capability in conditions of open armed
684 conflict. To support future joint campaigning, alternative frameworks must
685 have a much broader, relevant, and precise set of elements/considerations of
686 design that expands our understanding of operational art and ability to
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688 coherently develop successful campaigns. Below are examples of new and
689 logical considerations/elements of enhanced campaign design. This array
690 could include but is not limited to:

- 691
- 692 1.) Deep and relevant understanding of the environment, the adversary
693 and its behavior, and the contested political issue(s) at stake within
694 the context of international relations.
- 695 2.) Living assessment of the range and time interval of the possible (both
696 acceptable & unacceptable) political consequences of the
697 circumstance.
- 698 3.) Comprehension of the conditions and behaviors the joint force must
699 produce to achieve and enable an outcome within the range of
700 acceptability.
- 701 4.) Methodology of long-term Consolidation and Perpetuation
- 702 5.) Recommendation, selection, legitimization of the initial aim of the
703 associated policy shift – followed by continual maintenance and
704 refinement. (Civ/Mil dialogue)
- 705 6.) Principle and Supporting Narratives to counter existing narratives and
706 enable the joint force's efforts
- 707 7.) Coherent groupings of Authorizations and Permissions
- 708 8.) Interagency Alignment of efforts to achieve unity
- 709 9.) Synchronization, prioritization, and deconfliction of funding.
- 710 10.) Methodology for linking and arranging military actions and activities
711 toward the necessary condition and range of outcomes. This may
712 include concepts for achieving surprise, denial, and deception.
- 713 11.) Description of the simultaneous and continuous intricate
714 application, and command and control of the relevant force and
715 capabilities requirements, including the alignment of efforts of all
716 participating combatant commands and specific description of how
717 their contributions achieve an acceptable outcome.

718

719 Of course, these elements/considerations of true campaign design aren't
720 necessarily new ideas, but in terms of being grouped together and
721 characterized as fundamental to campaign and operational-level planning and
722 execution, these are far more relevant than the current array. Moreover, DoD
723 typically designs campaigns using the current elements, only to discover the
724 critical nature and necessity of these facets of campaigning after the fact, or
725 worse – during implementation and execution. These characteristics are
726 essential to the initial and ongoing logic of campaign design and continual
727 revision in execution. Combatant Commanders' and their staffs have already
728 adopted many of these principles and ideas behind them. The joint community
729 as an institution has to catch up and internalize a broader, more germane
730 array.

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731 **VI. Concept Required Capabilities. (TBD)**

732

733 **VII. Risks of Adopting this Concept. (TBD)**

734 Developing the ability to implement JCIC brings several potential
735 challenges and risks. The potential risks imply shortfalls in capability or
736 capacity that subsequent evaluation can further examine and identify potential
737 solutions.

738 • The risk that the USG interagency, along with key allies and partners, will
739 view DoD/USG as attempting to ‘militarize’ the diplomatic sphere of
740 international relations by providing more power, authority, and flexibility to
741 CCMDs.

742

743 • The risk that other USG Departments and Agencies, and already fiscally
744 constrained allies and partners, will choose to rely even more on Joint Force
745 assets and capabilities instead of investing in their own to conduct ‘steady-
746 state’ and routine, and often non-military, cooperative security activities.

747

748 **VIII. Conclusion. (TBD)**

749

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751

752

753 **Appendix A: Glossary (TBD)**

754

755 *Campaign-* a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing
756 a military strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.

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¹⁴ E.g., the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP); Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure (PMESII) analytical framework, Operational Design, etc...

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